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MOBILITY AND THE 
QUEST(ION) OF 
LEGITIMACY 
Rebecca Welge and Sebastian Kubitschko
From its initial starting point, the European Union has established a political environment in which economic opportunities have been prioritised over democratic ac-
tualities. The first right that individuals were granted in the 
EU, for example, was the free-movement right for workers 
in the 1950s and a number of rights directly associated with 
free movement. This, of course, was due to the fact that its 
‘founding’ institutions, the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), 
had economic rather than egalitarian ideals at the top of their 
agenda. To install a common market, workers were not only 
granted the right to seek a job within another Member State 
but also to work and reside there too. This initial right ena-
bled individuals to contribute to the development of an eco-
nomic community.
Maybe more importantly, individuals were not only ad-
ditionally granted the right to free movement but were also 
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granted the right to equal treatment with respect to working 
conditions and other benefits which facilitated integration in 
the host Member State (Art. 39 EC Treaty). Later, Council Di-
rectives (e.g. 68/360/EEC) and Regulations specified the abol-
ishment of restrictions on movement and residence within 
the EC for workers of EU Member States and their families. 
In particular, the European Court of Justice was responsible 
for pushing the legal scope of movement rights. Following 
the logic of market protection, new Member States such as 
Romania and Bulgaria have specific provisions in their acces-
sion treaties that define transition periods limiting the free 
movement of individuals from these Member States.
Today, free movement of individuals, along with nondis-
crimination, are still the seminal concepts behind EU citi-
zenship as are other rights directly linked to mobility which 
enable transboundary activities including 
studying, working or residing abroad. The 
high relevance of economic, educational and 
geographical mobility is also echoed in the 
recent Eurobarometer survey data, which 
attests that most people perceive EU citizen-
ship as the right of free movement, the right 
to study abroad and the right to work in different Member 
States. The total number of EU citizens who exercise their 
free movement rights is approximately 11.5 million, slightly 
more than the total population of Greece or the seven small-
est Member States put together. Interestingly enough, the 
overwhelming majority of EU citizens – about 95 percent 
– are living in their Member State of nationality. Obviously 
the perception that the EU is an area without national bor-
ders is important even for those who do not exercise their 
movement rights. Particularly the Schengen Area, which al-
lows people passport-free travel, and the single market seem 
to be important for the people’s perception of the EU as an 
area without borders. These areas affect also the 95 percent 
who do not use their rights to reside and work in a different 
Member State.
Structural elements of EU policy and legislation did not 
Today, free movement of 
individuals, along with 
nondiscrimination, are 
still the seminal concepts 
behind EU citizenship.
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explicitly preclude citizens’ political participation, but nei-
ther did they urge for a unified landscape in which people 
develop the abilities, needs or desire to engage in and con-
tribute to the political landscape they are living in. In general, 
arguments around citizens’ participation and ‘political en-
gagement’ are blowing from a different direction. Politicians, 
along with mass media outlets, never get tired of proclaiming 
that we are living through times of political fatigue, which, 
according to these voices, can be witnessed most obviously in 
the shockingly low voter turnout during national as well as 
European elections.
If recent history has proven anything, it is that citizens 
living in the EU are a world away from political fatigue. The 
increased intensity of political activities around Europe over 
the past months and years – ranging from peaceful to violent 
protest, from industrial action to volatile riots, from mass 
rallies to occupations – not only demonstrates levels of dis-
content, but also perhaps proves the general demand for in-
creased political inclusion.
Is anyone to blame for this clash between a civic drive 
towards political change and the EU’s rather constrained 
catalogue of priorities? Blaming any single institution or col-
lective of actors would oversimplify the circumstances and 
consequently not do justice to the complexity of the situa-
tion. Nevertheless, it might be possible to refer to specific 
dynamics and situations where the democratic deficit of Eu-
rope’s political landscape becomes apparent.
An astonishing aspect of the current Eurozone crisis, for 
example, is the fact that it has been framed almost exclusive-
ly as an ‘economic’ state of emergency – neither political or 
civic consequences were ever really discussed. In this phase 
of fundamental transfiguration (one that Angela Merkel por-
trayed as the most severe moment since WWII), there was no 
sign of opportunities for civic involvement or even citizens’ 
participation. 
Europe’s leaders – partly amongst themselves and partly 
as associates of the so-called Troika – met repeatedly to find 
the most gentle salvation for the people of Europe in general 
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and Greece as well as other Member States in particular. The 
only active role citizens play in this performance is by guar-
anteeing the future economic stability of the EU with their 
tax money, which aims to reach the absurd sum of €1 trillion. 
This role, however, is not a self-chosen one but has been as-
signed to them by a rather indifferent top-down decision. 
Another example of the critical disconnect between citi-
zens’ need to have a say beyond ritualised elections and the 
EU’s bureaucratic rigidity is the European referendum. After 
the rejected referenda in France and the Netherlands the rati-
fication process for the Constitutional Treaty was stopped, 
and, in the name of Europe’s future, the current Lisbon Trea-
ty was finally ratified without a referendum in most coun-
tries. Only in Ireland is the referendum obligatory; other-
wise, it’s most likely that the Irish government would have 
avoided risk of a further rejection. The preamble of exactly 
this treaty underlines the goal: ‘to continue the process of 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in 
which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen’. 
This aim is also echoed in various European initiatives, such 
as the Citizenship 2007-2013 Program, which aspire to ‘bring 
Europe closer to its citizens’. The parliamentary ratification 
procedures, which allow ratification of an EU treaty without 
a referendum in most Member States, not only drew criti-
cism by citizens hoping for a participatory process but also 
by those who had seen a chance to effectively express their 
dissatisfaction with the course of EU integration.
There is a consensus that people should be brought closer 
to the decision-making process. Having said that, the intent 
to do so in many ways appears to manifest itself in rhetorical 
declarations rather than in actual political scenarios. It is ex-
actly this nonlinear link between individuals and governance 
that causes criticism of the EU’s democratic nature and forms 
the standard version of the democratic deficit thesis.
What is clear from these examples is the way in which the 
EU is stretching its political legitimacy to the limit. And, per-
haps surprisingly, movement and mobility play a key role in 
this fundamental crisis of legitimacy. It is, however, not the 
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kind of mobility that politicians have been promoting in a 
surprisingly redundant manner. Whilst it is by all means im-
portant to appreciate and be aware of the level of economic, 
educational and geographical mobility that has been estab-
lished throughout the European region, it is time to address 
a different kind of mobility.
Mobility must be approached now as what it is: a multi-
layered phenomenon that exceeds the one-dimensional level 
of movement, which has been excessively related to eco-
nomic means. In other words, what is needed to (re)estab-
lish the political legitimacy of the EU is a drastic shift in the 
discourse of mobility. This is not to say that issues concern-
ing residency, education and the like have become invalid or 
trivial, but to emphasise that we need to go 
beyond a solely economic and geographical 
understanding of mobility. The ability to be 
mobile already implies the capacity to move 
towards something. Consequently, once we 
add a political perspective to our under-
standing of mobility and movement, it also describes the ca-
pacities through which citizens are able to ‘move’, that is to 
change, the political status quo. So far, the EU infrastructure 
has given its people the ability to be mobile travellers, work-
ers and students – and they highly appreciate that. What we 
need now are resources and infrastructure that enable citi-
zens to be mobile political agents – and there is no doubt they 
would appreciate these as well.
The idea that mobility should be understood not only in 
its ‘geographical’ meaning (travel, crossing borders) but also 
in its rather metaphorical ‘political’ connotation can be il-
lustrated by the following. At present in Europe and on the 
international scale we are witnessing the constitution of new 
hybrid institutions like the Troika, the Frankfurt Group, the 
European Financial Stability Facility (ESFS) and the Finan-
cial Stability Board (FSB). This consortium of non-elected or-
ganisations – composed of non-transparent mixtures of gov-
ernmental and economic actors – are configuring a political 
landscape that Angela Merkel has recently welcomed as ‘a de-
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mocracy in line with the market’. Their conceptual endeavour 
is to respond instantaneously to largely monetary challenges 
and turbulences – in other words, they aim to move quickly 
between the interconnected worlds of finance and politics. 
However, this speed of movement comes at a very high price.
While on the one hand the space to manoeuvre has been 
amplified for these new semi-democratic institutions, citi-
zens’ ability to change the political status quo on the other 
hand is in decline. To bring this idea back into the metaphori-
cal setting of mobility: Instead of being able to move across 
relevant spaces of influence, citizens’ scope of action (or their 
ability to ‘move politics’), is being increasingly diminished, 
because the determining actors and institutions are out of 
reach of normal citizens. The EU simply has no mechanisms 
or democratic infrastructures at hand that would allow citi-
zens to pressure, elect or exert influence over intergovern-
mental organisations. Political decisions, in other words, are 
today made beyond the reach of Europeans. As long as politi-
cians, practitioners as well as scholars continue to exclusively 
focus on the geographical and economic aspects of mobility 
the discourse around participatory structures and practices 
will only slowly, if at all, advance. 
